BUREAUCRATIC INSTABILITY AND THE POLITICS OF TRANSFERS

The campaign for promoting investment in the State after the successful Rising Rajasthan Global Investment Summit in December 2025 is progressing extremely well. In fact, the follow up is so scientific as compared to any other state that it floors one. The Chief Minister promised an annual review and that has happened. This was preceded by a rigorous process of follow up at three levels i.e. proposals over `1,000 crore to be reviewed by the CM. Proposals from `100 crore to `1,000 crore by the Chief Secretary and everything below that by the Principal Secretary Industries. The process thus helped keep track of all proposals.

The first problem is government approval which happened but others include myriad compliances and approvals where the government is the sole arbiter. There is a single window system though it doesn’t address the necessity of compliances. This is being done by CUTS in association with the Industries Department. Another issue for starting is the issue of getting suitable land. This stands as a major handicap when many proposals flopped in the past. The government has adopted a unique process where land is being allotted to prospective industries through auctions on a priority basis. Hence the approach taken by the government to focus on land is very wise.

However, to implement all these steps one requires good and stable personnel. The continuity, intent and honesty of dealing officers who should be committed to delivering the goods is therefore important. Intent and honesty are subjective factors but can be judged on the basis of objective surveys. However, lack of continuity can be a big disincentive to the concerned officer to deliver. Some work knowing very well that tenures are not assured. In Rajasthan, the frequent transfers within the Industries Department, particularly in the Rajasthan State Industrial Development and Investment Corporation (RIICO), exemplify this issue. Notably, RIICO has seen four Managing Directors (MDs) within a single year, leading to concerns about administrative continuity and efficiency.

The Supreme Court’s judgment in TSR Subramanian & Ors. vs. Union of India & Ors. (31 October 2013) addressed the instability caused by frequent bureaucratic transfers. The Court directed the establishment of fixed minimum tenures for civil servants to promote stability and reduce political interference. Frequent transfers, especially in key departments like industries, disrupt policy continuity and hinder long-term planning. In agencies like RIICO, the constant change in leadership can lead to inconsistent decision-making and a lack of sustained vision, adversely affecting industrial growth and investor confidence.

Moreover, these transfers often result in additional charges being assigned to other officers, overburdening them and potentially compromising the quality of governance. While recruitment into civil services is conducted through competitive examinations, the real issue lies in transfers and postings, which remain under political control. The 2nd Administrative Reforms Commission (1969) and the Hota Committee Report (2004) have highlighted the need to reduce political interference in these processes to ensure a merit-based and stable bureaucracy.

Frequent transfers create instability, reduce efficiency, and can discourage potential investors. Inconsistent leadership in agencies like RIICO can lead to delays in project approvals and implementation, deterring businesses from investing in the state. Studies, such as those by Iyer & Mani (2012), have shown that political changes often influence bureaucratic turnover, further exacerbating instability.

The Industries Department plays a pivotal role in shaping industrial policy and attracting investments. In Rajasthan, the frequent changes within the department have raised concerns about the state’s ability to effectively implement industrial policies and maintain investor confidence. Implementation of these MoUs depends significantly on the stability and efficiency of the Industries Department. The question arises: How will the uncertainty of tenures impact the execution of these MoUs and the overall burden on governance?

Comparatively, states with stable bureaucratic leadership in their industries departments have demonstrated better industrial growth. For example, good performing states like Gujarat, Tamil Nadu, Andhra Pradesh, Telangana etc have maintained consistent leadership in its industrial bodies, resulting in streamlined policy implementation and higher investor confidence. In contrast, states experiencing frequent bureaucratic reshuffles often struggle with policy discontinuity and diminished investor trust.

In response to the Supreme Court’s directives, the Indian Administrative Service (Cadre) Amendment Rules were introduced in 2014 and 2016 to ensure fixed tenures for civil servants. The rules also provide for action against non-performing bureaucrats, These amendments aimed to provide stability and insulate bureaucrats from undue political influence. Additionally, the establishment of Civil Services Boards (CSBs) was mandated to oversee transfers, removal and postings. However, many states have been slow to implement these measures effectively. Reports indicate that states like Punjab, Rajasthan and Haryana have faced challenges in constituting functional CSBs, leading to continued political interference in bureaucratic appointments and/or removals.

The frequent transfers within Rajasthan’s Industries Department, underscore the persistent challenges in achieving bureaucratic stability. Such instability not only hampers administrative efficiency but also poses significant risks to investor confidence and economic development. To address these issues, it is imperative to ensure greater transparency in postings, establish independent oversight bodies, and strictly enforce the Supreme Court’s directives on fixed tenures. Structural reforms in administrative governance are essential to cultivate a stable and efficient bureaucracy, capable of effectively translating investment commitments into tangible developmental outcomes.

THE VIEWS EXPRESSED BY THE AUTHOR ARE PERSONAL

Pradeep S Mehta & Madhvendra S Panwar, The writers work at CUTS International