POWERING UP THE SKIES

Former Chief of Air Staff Air Chief Marshal A P Singh, who retired on October 31 recently sounded a clear warning: the Indian Air Force needs to induct around 36 to 40 fighter aircraft every year if it is to arrest the decline in squadron strength and begin moving towards its sanctioned strength of 42.5 squadrons.

The figure 42.5 refers to fighter squadrons, not individual aircraft, and squadron strength varies according to aircraft type and operational requirements.

With the IAF currently operating around 29 fighter squadrons, the shortfall is best understood as a gap of roughly 13.5 squadrons rather than converted into a precise number of aircraft.

Singh has said the force needs roughly two squadrons’ worth of new fighters every year to arrest the decline. The concern is not new, but the scale of the annual requirement underlines how serious the situation has become.

Ageing fleets have retired faster than replacements have arrived, with the phase-out of the MiG-21 further reducing operational squadron strength.

Responding recently to questions on fighter strength, Singh said the IAF could begin inducting around 30 to 35 aircraft annually if ongoing plans progress as expected.

Hindustan Aeronautics Limited is seeking to increase production of the LCA Tejas Mk1A, while other fighter acquisition and production programmes are expected to provide additional streams of induction.

The numbers matter because the Air Force is racing against time. Unless aircraft begin entering service at a much faster rate, the IAF risks spending the coming years merely preventing further erosion rather than restoring its sanctioned strength.

Yet air power cannot be measured by squadron numbers alone. According to the independent World Directory of Modern Military Aircraft, or WDMMA, its published database lists the IAF inventory at 1,716 aircraft, including 542 fighters, 498 helicopters, 282 transport aircraft and 374 trainers, besides tankers and specialmission platforms.

WDMMA ranks the IAF sixth among 129 individual military aviation services globally, behind the US Air Force, US Navy, Russian Air Force, US Army and US Marine Corps.

These figures, however, are open-source estimates rather than official IAF inventory numbers should be treated accordingly.

The WDMMA database also continues to list aircraft that have undergone recent fleet-status changes, including MiG-21s, illustrate why its figures are better viewed as broad inventory estimates rather than an exact snapshot of current operational strength.

India nevertheless continues to field a formidable mix of frontline combat aircraft, including Rafale, Su-30MKI, MiG29, Mirage 2000 and indigenous Tejas fighters, backed by sophisticated air-defence, missile and surveillance systems.

The challenge is not whether India possesses substantial air power. It is whether that power can be modernised quickly enough. That question gains urgency from developments across the western border.

Singh has described reports of Pakistan acquiring Chinese fifth-generation fighters and training pilots in China as a “cause of worry”, while making it clear that the threat posed by any new aircraft depends heavily on how effectively it is integrated into a wider combat network.

Reports have linked Pakistan with possible acquisition of Chinese stealth fighters. If such aircraft are eventually inducted, their significance would extend beyond stealth alone.

Modern air warfare is increasingly networked, and the effectiveness of a fighter depends on its integration with radars, airborne early warning systems, electronic warfare platforms, data links, command networks and longrange weapons.

That is why India’s response cannot be limited to acquiring more aircraft. It must strengthen the entire combat ecosystem. At the centre of the effort is the indigenous Tejas programme.

The LCA Tejas Mk1A is expected to become an important part of near-term inductions, while the more capable Tejas Mk2 is intended to strengthen the medium-weight fighter segment later.

Production speed, however, remains critical. Delays in aircraft induction have already become a major concern for the IAF, and Singh has repeatedly stressed that technology and capability delivered late can lose much of their operational value.

Another important pillar is the proposed acquisition of 114 fighters under the wider fighter procurement programme.

Current reporting indicates that a proposal for 114 Rafale fighters is under consideration, with Defence Secretary Rajesh Kumar Singh saying a deal could be concluded by the end of the financial year.

The broader aim is to eventually operate a manageable mix of fewer principal fighter types, reducing logistical complexity while maintaining aircraft capable of different missions, ranges and payload requirements.

Fifth-generation fighters combine reduced radar signature with advanced avionics, networking, sensor fusion and high situational awareness. Countering them requires more than possessing another advanced fighter.

It requires a network capable of detecting, tracking and engaging threats across multiple domains. That brings the debate back to the real challenge facing the IAF: speed.

India does not lack fighter programmes, missile programmes, air-defence systems or indigenous aerospace ambitions. What matters now is how quickly those programmes translate into operational capability.

Every year of delay creates a double burden. Older platforms move closer to retirement while replacement aircraft, engines, radars and weapons remain in development or production.

Singh has summed up that problem in a memorable phrase: “Technology delayed is technology denied.” Production capacity is therefore becoming as important as technological sophistication.

An aircraft on a drawing board, or even a prototype undergoing trials, does not add to squadron strength. What matters operationally is how rapidly aircraft and their associated weapons, engines, sensors and spares can be manufactured, delivered and absorbed into frontline service.

For the IAF, the immediate arithmetic remains stark. Around 29 fighter squadrons have to move towards a sanctioned strength of 42.5 even as existing aircraft continue to age.

Inducting 36 to 40 fighters every year may sound ambitious, but it is increasingly the scale required simply to arrest the decline and begin rebuilding combat strength. India already possesses one of the world’s most significant air forces.

The question now is whether it can build, acquire and induct the next generation of combat capability fast enough.

" 'THE INDIAN NAVY SHOWS THE INDIGENOUS WAY'

The Indian Navy offers a useful comparison in indigenous defence production.

It has built a strong domestic design-and-construction ecosystem centred on its Warship Design Bureau and Indian shipyards.

Project 17A frigates, for instance, have been designed in-house by the Navy’s Warship Design Bureau and constructed in Indian yards.

The Navy’s Project 15B destroyers and Project 17A frigates were also designed domestically, with a large proportion of equipment and systems sourced from Indian companies, including MSMEs.

The lesson for military aviation is not that shipbuilding and aircraft production are identical, but that sustained coordination among the user, designer, manufacturer and industry can strengthen indigenous capability over time.

The larger lesson is one of jointnes "